Goble and Gerber v. Montana State Fund, 2014 MT 99 The rational basis test applies when considering equal protection challenges to the WCA, which requires that the challenged statute bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.  Under the public policy considerations of the WCA - to provide wage-loss benefits which bear a reasonable relationship to actual wages lost, and to return a worker to work as soon as possible - § 39-71-744, MCA, removes from the pool of eligible beneficiaries those who cannot return to work because of incarceration and who are unable to earn a wage.  This rationally advances the legitimate governmental interests of the WCA.

Goble and Gerber v. Montana State Fund, 2014 MT 99 When analyzing an equal protection claim, the Court follows a three-step process: (1) identify the classes involved and determine if they are similarly situated; (2) determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the challenged legislation; and (3) apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to the challenged statute.  Two groups are similarly situated if they are equivalent in all relevant respects other than the factor constituting the alleged discrimination.  The WCC erred in finding that those who qualify for PPD benefits under § 39-71-703, MCA, are not similarly situated to those also meeting the criteria for -703 benefits who are incarcerated for more than thirty days, since the WCC found a rational basis for treating the two classes differently, thereby jumping ahead in its analysis.

Malcomson v. Liberty Northwest, 2014 MT 242 The unconstitutionality of § 39-71-604(3), MCA (2003), under Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.  The statute as currently written is overbroad and cannot stand.  The method for obtaining relevant medical information in effect prior to § 39-71-604(3), MCA (2003), was narrowly tailored to effectuate the State’s interests, and the State was long able to administer the workers’ compensation program without exposing injured workers to a potential violation of their constitutional right of privacy.

Malcomson v. Liberty Northwest, 2014 MT 242 Where the claimant did not dispute that an insurer is entitled to access to medical information relevant to her claim, but objected only to the provision of § 39-71-604(3), MCA, which permitted an insurer’s agent  to communicate directly with her healthcare providers without prior notice to her or the opportunity to participate in the discussion, the Court rejected the insurer’s position that the claimant had no right of privacy in her medical information because she was on notice that § 39-71-604(3), MCA, abrogated that right.

Malcomson v. Liberty Northwest [08/16/13] 2013 MTWCC 21 Although the State has a compelling interest in the orderly administration of the workers’ compensation process, § 39-71-604(3), MCA, is not narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest.  Rather, it abrogates a claimant’s ability to safeguard his or her constitutional right of privacy in exchange for an arguably – and debatable – more efficient exchange of information between the insurer and the claimant’s healthcare providers. As applied to the facts herein, § 39-71-604(3), MCA (2007), unconstitutionally violates the claimant’s right of privacy under Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution.

Malcomson v. Liberty Northwest [08/16/13] 2013 MTWCC 21 The Montana Supreme Court has long recognized that the privacy interests concerning a person’s medical information implicates Article II, Section 10, of the Montana Constitution.  Montanans’ fundamental right of individual privacy is not absolute.  When an injured worker files a claim, she relinquishes privacy rights to all medical records and information relevant to the claim.  The State has a compelling interest in the orderly administration of its workers’ compensation laws and as part of such administration, insurers have the right of access to a claimant’s relevant medical information.

George v. Bowler, 2015 MT 209, 380 Mont. 155, 354 P.3d 585 Separate legal entities are not considered  “third parties” as that term is used in § 39-71-412, MCA, and Article II, § 16 of the Montana Constitution when they are acting within the course and scope of their employment as co-employees of the claimant at the time the alleged negligence occurred.

George v. Bowler, 2015 MT 209, 380 Mont. 155, 354 P.3d 585 For purposes of applying the co-employee immunity rule, the simple fact that two persons have the same employer would not necessarily invoke the rule.  The proper test for determining when a co-worker is an “employee” for purposes of applying the co-employee immunity rule in § 39-71-412, MCA, is whether the co-employee was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time the negligent acts occurred.

Stokes v. Golden Triangle, Inc., 2015 MT 199, 380 Mont. 93, 353 P.3d 500 Section 39-71-411, MCA, grants insured employers tort immunity from negligence actions brought by their employees provided that the insurer employer is not subject to any liability under the WCA.  This statute implements Art. II, § 16, Mont. Const.

Thayer (Deceased), Phyllis Thayer v. UEF [10/28/98] 1998 MTWCC 77. The statutory authorization that the UEF may discharge benefits payable to claimants of uninsured employers by the amount of third-party recovery does not violate the "full redress" provision of Article II, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution. See also Montana Supreme Court decision affirming WCC, Thayer v. UEF, 1999 MT 304.

Goble and Gerber v. Montana State Fund, 2014 MT 99 Due process is flexible; it calls for whatever procedural protections as the particular situation demands.  The claimants were afforded procedural due process where the insurer informed them in writing that their PPD benefits were being terminated pursuant to § 39-71-744(1), MCA, and they contested the termination in a hearing before the WCC in which they were represented by counsel with the opportunity to present evidence and argument.  Their ignorance of the existence of § 39-71-744(1), MCA, does not mean their procedural due process rights were violated.

Goble and Gerber v. Montana State Fund, 2014 MT 99 Section 39-71-744, MCA, does not violate the quid pro quo basis of the WCA, which required labor to accept guaranteed, no-fault recovery while relieving industry of the possibility of large and potentially uncapped recoveries in the tort system.  While an incarcerated claimant cannot return to the workforce and is therefore ineligible for PPD benefits, he is still eligible for medical benefits while incarcerated and is therefore consistent with the quid pro quo of the WCA.

Goble and Gerber v. Montana State Fund, 2014 MT 99 The state cannot use its power to take unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious action against an individual; therefore, a statute enacted by the Legislature must be reasonably related to a permissible legislative objective in order to satisfy guarantees of substantive due process.  Section 39-71-744, MCA, is not arbitrary; a rational basis exists for treating incarcerated claimants differently from those who choose to be law-abiding, and the statute serves to carry out the public policy provisions of the WCA stated in § 39-71-105(1), -105(3), MCA.

Walters v. Flathead Concrete Products, Inc. [03/16/11] 2011 MT 45 A non-dependent beneficiary parent demonstrated sufficient interest to challenge whether the quid pro quo of the WCA satisfied substantive due process, where she received minimal payment compared to wage loss benefits paid to a dependent parent.  However, the Legislature clearly intended to limit wage loss benefits to people who depended upon the worker’s wages - those made most vulnerable by the worker’s death. 

Walters v. Flathead Concrete Products, Inc. [03/16/11] 2011 MT 45 Under a challenge by a non-dependent parent, the WCA satisfies substantive due process and the quid pro quo and is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, where it provides for medical, hospital, and burial expenses for deceased workers and wage loss benefits for their dependents, while providing minimal payment to their non-dependent parents.

Hegg v. Montana State Fund [10/10/16] 2016 MTWCC 14 The remedy in a case in which workers’ compensation benefits are insufficient to uphold the quid pro quo is to strike the employer’s exclusive remedy defense and allow the employee to proceed with a tort claim – a decision that is solely within the province of the district court in a civil action against the employer.  Where this Court cannot grant the claimant the remedy she seeks – i.e., to increase the amount of her benefits to an amount that would be sufficient – it will not rule on the claimant’s substantive due process challenge against § 39-71-721(2), MCA.

Gerber v. Montana State Fund [03/28/13] 2013 MTWCC 9 Section 39-71-744(1), MCA, does not violate Petitioner’s right to substantive due process, for the statute bears a rational relationship to the express legislative purpose of providing wage-loss benefits in a reasonable relationship to actual wages lost, and of returning a worker to work as quickly as possible after the worker has suffered an on-the-job injury or disease.  An incarcerated worker has voluntarily removed himself from the competitive labor market by committing a crime; he is not losing wages due to his injury, and he cannot return to work until released from jail or prison.

Goble v. Montana State Fund [03/28/13] 2013 MTWCC 8 Section 39-71-744(1), MCA, does not violate Petitioner’s right to substantive due process, for the statute bears a rational relationship to the express legislative purpose of providing wage-loss benefits in a reasonable relationship to actual wages lost, and of returning a worker to work as quickly as possible after the worker has suffered an on-the-job injury or disease. An incarcerated worker has voluntarily removed himself from the competitive labor market by committing a crime; he is not losing wages due to his injury, and he cannot return to work until released from jail or prison.

Goble v. Montana State Fund [03/28/13] 2013 MTWCC 8 Section 39-71-744(1), MCA, does not violate Petitioner’s right to substantive due process for failing to satisfy the quid pro quo principle behind the WCA - the surrendering of the injured workers’ right to sue his employer in tort in exchange for disability benefits - since the Petitioner here received sufficiently significant benefits, in the form of temporary total disability benefits prior to his incarceration and remains eligible for medical benefits, so as to satisfy the quid pro quo doctrine.

Goble and Gerber v. Montana State Fund, 2014 MT 99 Section 39-71-744, MCA, does not violate the prohibition against excessive fines found in Article II, section 22, of the Montana Constitution.  The claimants’ ineligibility for PPD benefits was a consequence of their incarceration and unrelated to the terms of their underlying sentence, and was neither punitive nor an aspect of their punishment.

Gerber v. Montana State Fund [03/28/13] 2013 MTWCC 9 Petitioner argues that the effect of § 39-71-744, MCA, is the imposition of an excessive fine in violation of Article II, § 22 of the Montana Constitution, since it deprives him of PPD benefits.  Assuming arguendo that Petitioner’s argument had merit, the forum in which to challenge the imposition of this “excessive fine” would be the court that actually imposed the sentence, not the Workers’ Compensation Court.

Goble v. Montana State Fund [03/28/13] 2013 MTWCC 8 Petitioner argues that the effect of § 39-71-744, MCA, is the imposition of an excessive fine in violation of Article II, § 22 of the Montana Constitution, since it deprives him of PPD benefits. Assuming arguendo that Petitioner’s argument had merit, the forum in which to challenge the imposition of this “excessive fine” would be the court that actually imposed the sentence, not the Workers’ Compensation Court.

Article II, section 25

Article VII, section 2