39-71-613, MCA

Chippewa v. Uninsured Employers' Fund [11/05/12] 2012 MTWCC 39 Contrary to the third-party respondent’s interpretation, nothing in § 39-71-613, MCA, provides a mechanism by which an employer might recover his attorney fees in this Court.

Pinnow v. MSF [02/24/06] 2006 MTWCC 9 Pursuant to §§ 39-71-613, -614, MCA, the Court believes the 20 percent contingent fee is reasonable. Pursuant to § 39-71-614(3), MCA, the Court believes the parties entered into a binding contingent fee agreement and no mutual mistake of fact or any other defense has been raised upon which this Court could void that binding agreement.
[1999] Bustell v. AIG Claims Service and The Ins. Co. of PA [11/14/03] 2003 MTWCC 66 While the attorney fee regulation of the Department of Labor and Industry, ARM 24.29.3802, was expressly enacted under section 39-71-613, MCA (1999), subsection (2) of that section generally authorizes it to establish attorney fees. The provision in section 39-71-614(2), MCA (1999), limiting the Court to the Departmentís schedule when awarding attorney fees is mere recognition of the Departmentís authority under section 39-71-613, MCA. Affirmed in Bustell v. AIG Claims Service Inc., 2004 MT 362 (No. 04-124)
[1985] Riley v. W.R. Grace [9/10/99] 1999 MTWCC 56 Attorneys fees must be awarded under a specific statutory provision. Section 39-71-613, MCA (1985) is not applicable to claim for attorneys fees following Declaratory Judgment action involving insurer's right to offset death benefits because the action did not involve a "hearing" as described within that statute. Fees are awarded under section 39-71-612, MCA (1985) because the dispute concerned "the amount of compensation due." The amount of attorneys fees is governed by section 39-71-614, MCA (1985), which awards fees based on the time spent by the attorney, not upon a contingency agreement.