George v. Bowler, 2015 MT 209, 380 Mont. 155, 354 P.3d 585 Montana has rejected the “dual capacity” doctrine, which allows suit against an employer for negligence committed in a capacity separate from its capacity as employer, since it would “go a long way toward destroying the exclusive remedy principle.”

George v. Bowler, 2015 MT 209, 380 Mont. 155, 354 P.3d 585 Warehouse owners who rented warehouse to their employer were acting in the course and scope of their employment while supervising and controlling the work of claimant – who also worked for and was being paid by the same employer as the warehouse owners.  Since the claimant claimed and received workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, the warehouse owners were immune from claimant’s suit for injuries.  Even though owners were also general contractors on warehouse construction and were separate legal entities from employer, one of the owners was the employer’s warehouse manager and was acting on behalf of employer when supervising claimant, the project on which claimant was working was for benefit of employer, and claimant was working for employer at the time of his accident. 

George v. Bowler, 2015 MT 209, 380 Mont. 155, 354 P.3d 585 The exclusivity provision in the Workers’ Compensation Act is an affirmative defense.

Stokes v. Golden Triangle, Inc., 2015 MT 199, 380 Mont. 93, 353 P.3d 500 An employer is covered by a valid workers’ compensation insurance policy if the policy inadvertently fails to name the employer as one of the entities it insured.  Here, both the insurer and the employer agree the employer was covered under the policy; the policy used the employer’s payroll to calculate the premium; the application included the employer’s information, including its FEIN; the associated documents, including the insurance binder, named the employer as a covered insured; the premiums remained unchanged after the insurer corrected the policy endorsement to name the employer among the insured; the failure to name the employer in the policy was inadvertent; and the insurer paid, and the claimant accepted, workers’ compensation benefits under the policy in the claimant’s employer’s name.

Harris v. State, Dep't of Corrections [01/29/13] 2013 MT 16 The employer’s knowledge that the possibility of serious injury existed from voluntarily tasering the claimant as part of his SWAT training was insufficient to show an intentional and deliberate act by his employer.  A chance of injury is not the same as a deliberate act to injure under § 39-71-413, MCA, and a risk of injury does not establish actual knowledge of certain injury as required by the statute.  Claimant’s suit is therefore barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA, § 39-71-411, MCA.

[1995] Okuly v. USF&G Insurance Company, 2003 MT 291 Following Hubbel v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 218 Mont. 21, 706 P.1d 111 (1985), and relying on section 39-71-411, MCA, the Montana Supreme Court held that the Workers’ Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for the heirs and personal representatives of decedent, who was killed in an automobile accident in a car driven by a co-employee in the course and scope of employment. Recovery was not permitted under the uninsured motorist provision of the employer’s general liability policy.