Constitutional Law: Due Process
Hopkins v. Uninsured Employers' Fund [03/20/09] 2009 MTWCC 12 Although the UEF asserted that its third-party petition put the uninsured employer on notice of Petitioner’s claim for benefits and the employer’s obligation to indemnify the UEF, and further asserted that the employer was given “an opportunity to participate in the mediation,” neither of these actions fulfill the due process requirements of §§ 39-71-506, -2401(2)-(3), MCA, and therefore the third-party petition is dismissed. |
Thompson v. State of Montana and Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. and Montana State Fund [10/18/05] 2005 MTWCC 53 Mont. Const., Art. II, § 17, prohibits insurers or their representatives from engaging in ex parte communications with a claimant’s treating health care provider under the auspices of either section 39-71-604(3), MCA (2003), or section 50-16-527(5), MCA (2003). |
Bustell
v. AIG Claims Service and The Ins. Co. of PA [11/14/03] 2003 MTWCC 66
While the attorney fee regulation
of the Department of Labor and Industry, ARM 24.29.3802, was expressly
enacted under section 39-71-613, MCA (1999), subsection (2) of that section
generally authorizes it to establish attorney fees. The provision in section
39-71-614(2), MCA (1999), limiting the Court to the Department's schedule
when awarding attorney fees is mere recognition of the Department's authority
under section 39-71-613, MCA. The claimant's attorney therefore had fair
notice of the limitation and was not denied due process of law by application
of the fee schedule. Affirmed in Bustell
v. AIG Claims Service Inc., 2004 MT 362 (No. 04-124). |
Kemp
v. Montana Contractor Compensation Fund [6/4/98] 1998 MTWCC 46 Claimant
argued section 39-71-1006, MCA (1995) was unconstitutional in that it
denied him due process through judicial review of a rehabilitation decision
and represented an unconstitutional delegation of authority to a private
party. WCC rejected the constitutional challenge. On its face, the statute
does not prohibit the parties from petitioning the WCC when a dispute
arises over a rehabilitation decision. Even if the section did prohibit
review, the remedy would be to strike down the denial of judicial review,
not to invalidate the statute in its entirely. As shown by prior decisions
of the WCC, this Court has entertained and decided rehabilitation questions.
|
Wiard
v. Liberty NW [6/08/01] 2001 MTWCC 31 Failure of the insurer to
inform claimant of 60 month provision limiting medical benefits under
1991 law does not violate claimant's right to due process of law. |