Brown v. Morin [06/09/15] 2015 MTWCC 10 While M.R.Civ.P. 5(b) and M.R.Civ.P. 45(c) impose an obligation on a party to provide notice of any subpoena served by serving the party’s attorney with a copy, the obligation to notify parties of a subpoena does not trump the requirements that a subpoena duces tecum be personally served upon the party commanded to produce the documents by a person who is not a party to the case.

Bailey v. Uninsured Employers' Fund [12/14/10] 2010 MTWCC 34 Section 39-71-520(2), MCA, requires that a petition to this Court must be filed within 60 days of the mailing of the mediator’s report.  Rule 6(e), M.R.Civ.P., does not apply to this time limit because the statute does not rely on “service” as the basis for commencing the 60-day time period.  Therefore, delivering the report by mail does not add three additional days to the time limit.

Spencer v. Montana Schools Group Ins. Authority [06/10/15] 2015 MTWCC 11 Since permitting amendments to the pleadings is the general rule and denying leave to amend is the exception, Petitioner was not unduly prejudiced by allowing Respondent to amend its pleadings to add a second statute of limitations defense when Petitioner knew of both affirmative defenses yet went ahead and incurred experts’ fees anyway; and Respondent’s motion to amend was filed timely in accordance with the Scheduling Order.

Spencer v. Montana Schools Group Ins. Authority [06/10/15] 2015 MTWCC 11 A motion to amend the response to the Petition for Hearing was not untimely when it was filed less than three months after the petition was filed and within the time allowed by the Scheduling Order. 

Shell v. Valor Ins. Co. [03/24/06] 2006 MTWCC 12 Rule 15(a), Mont. R. Civ. P., provides that a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served and otherwise by leave of court, said leave to be freely given when justice so requires. A document captioned as a “Response to Motion” which fails to substantively address the motion within the body of the brief is insufficient to constitute substantive opposition to that motion, and thus as provided for in Rule 24.5.316 ARM, the failure of an adverse party to timely file an answer brief may be deemed an admission that the motion is well taken.

Moreau v. Transportation Ins. Co. [08/26/15] 2015 MTWCC 17 An employer insured under Plan No. 2 does not have an interest in a workers’ compensation case because it is not and cannot be liable for the benefits sought.  The Court can provide complete relief between the estate of the injured worker and the insurer and the employer is not a necessary or indispensable party under M.R.Civ.P. 19.

Moreau v. Transportation Ins. Co. [08/26/15] 2015 MTWCC 17 Persons whose interests are one step removed from the issue in the case are neither necessary nor indispensable parties under M.R.Civ.P. 19.  Therefore, an employer insured under Plan No. 2 is neither necessary nor indispensable even though the employer entered into an agreement to indemnify its insurer.  An insurer’s duty to pay benefits is nondelegable.

Emanuel v. Montana State Fund [05/01/15] 2015 MTWCC 8 Because the Court can determine whether Petitioner was an employee of an uninsured contractor, or an independent contractor working under a valid ICEC, the Court can determine the Petitioner’s employment status without joinder of the UEF.

Emanuel v. Montana State Fund [05/01/15] 2015 MTWCC 8 A party to the action can call the UEF’s agents as witnesses and can offer its documents into evidence without forcing the UEF to be a party to this action merely to explain its reasons for denying liability.

Moreau v. Transportation Ins. Co. [08/26/15] 2015 MTWCC 17 An employer insured under Plan No. 2 does not have an interest in a workers’ compensation case because it is not and cannot be liable for the benefits sought.  The Court can provide complete relief between the estate of the injured worker and the insurer and even though the employer agreed to indemnify the insurer, it is not jointly or severally liable for benefits and is therefore not a proper party under M.R.Civ.P. 20.

Moreau v. Transportation Ins. Co. [08/26/15] 2015 MTWCC 17 The Court denied an employer’s motion to intervene where the Court could not determine whether the employer’s involvement would delay the case.  Although the employer argued that Petitioner’s contention that it would cause delay was “speculative,” as the moving party, the employer had the burden of proving that its intervention would not result in delay, and it failed to do so here.

Moreau v. Transportation Ins. Co. [08/26/15] 2015 MTWCC 17 The Court denied an employer’s motion to intervene where the Court determined that the employer’s interests were aligned with its insurer’s and that the insurer was adequately representing the employer’s interests.

Moreau v. Transportation Ins. Co. [08/26/15] 2015 MTWCC 17 Where an employer knew about a dispute for over a year prior to moving to intervene, the Court held that its motion was untimely.

McCoy v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. [04/07/14] 2014 MTWCC 3A Rule 24(b)(2)  The Court agreed with the Department that, since it has the right to enter into reciprocal agreements with other states under § 39-71-402, MCA, it had clear justification to intervene in a matter in which this Court interpreted the 2007 Montana-North Dakota Reciprocal Agreement.

T.B. v. Montana State Fund [09/29/15] 2015 MTWCC 18 Under the broad rules of discovery, the requesting party need not meet any threshold before the opposing party has to produce relevant information she has deemed “private” on her Facebook page where the discovery request is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  However, the requesting party does not get unfettered access to the opposing party’s private Facebook posts, but rather the opposing party has the duty to review her pages and produce only those posts, photographs, and other information which are responsive to the request for production and which are not privileged.

Vulk v. Employers Compensation Ins. Co. [05/15/14] 2014 MTWCC 13 Since Rule 26 disclosers filed in court are a matter of public record and their production would not create a privacy issue, the Court denied Respondent’s motion for a protective order against Petitioner’s interrogatory which requested production of all Rule 26 disclosures filed in State or Federal District Court on behalf of an IME physician.  However, the Court limited the scope of the discovery request to the last three years and only those disclosures which are in the possession of Respondent or of the IME physician.

Vandervalk v. Montana State Fund [07/23/09] 2009 MTWCC 24 A subpoena duces tecum served for the purpose of obtaining documents concerning the State’s records and litigation materials involving a prescription drug is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in a workers’ compensation case where the claimant’s stated reasons for wanting the records have no clear connection to his workers’ compensation claim.

MacGillivray v. Montana State Fund [10/04/16] 2016 MTWCC 13 Where this Court found that Petitioner's treating physician did not change his opinion, Petitioner's condition did not change, and insurer simply wanted another IME to bolster the opinions of the first IME doctor, DLI lacked the good cause necessary under M.R.Civ.P. 35(a) to order Petitioner to attend a second IME.

Brown v. Morin [06/09/15] 2015 MTWCC 10 Where a subpoena duces tecum was improperly served by mailing it to the opposing party’s attorney less than 10 days before that party’s deposition, the party improperly served had no duty or obligation to object to the improper service or to move to quash the subpoena.

Brown v. Morin [06/09/15] 2015 MTWCC 10 Where a party attempted to serve a subpoena duces tecum on Petitioner by mailing it to Petitioner’s attorney, the Court held that service was improper.  A party cannot properly serve a subpoena by mailing it.

Brown v. Morin [06/09/15] 2015 MTWCC 10 Where a party attempted to serve a subpoena duces tecum on Petitioner by mailing it to Petitioner’s attorney, the Court held that service was improper.  A party to a case cannot serve a subpoena personally.

Vandervalk v. Montana State Fund [07/23/09] 2009 MTWCC 24 A subpoena duces tecum which requests 20 years’ worth of State records which pertain in any manner to a particular prescription medication is unduly burdensome as the claimant has taken no reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense upon the State.

Satterlee v. Lumberman's Mutual, 2007 MT 325 Although Workers’ Compensation Court orders generally contain a one-line entry certifying a judgment as final for purposes of appeal, the Montana Supreme Court requested the WCC designate in the future whether its certification for appeal falls under Admin. R. M. 24.5.348(2) or under Mont. Civ. P. Rule 54(b) as a judgment with remaining issues or parties.

Satterlee v. Lumberman's Mutual, 2007 MT 325 The Montana Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal without prejudice after the Workers’ Compensation Court certified its order granting the respondent’s motion for partial summary judgment as final for purposes of appeal. The court held the WCC failed to comply with Mont. Civ. P. Rule 54(b) because: the WCC set forth no rationale or reasoning supporting its decision to certify its order as final; and, two constitutional challenges remained before the WCC.

George v. Bowler, 2015 MT 209, 380 Mont. 155, 354 P.3d 585 After the party moving for summary judgment meets its initial burden in establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish with substantial evidence, as opposed to mere denial, speculation, or conclusory assertions, that a genuine issue of material fact does exist or that the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.