Newlon v. Teck American, Inc. [11/10/15] 2015 MT 317, 381 Mont. 378, 360 P.3d 1134 The tenet of freedom of contract allows a party to a settlement agreement to make a promise that is durable beyond the limits of the 60-months rule.  Therefore, where the parties agreed to settle the claimant’s claim for $25,000 and lifetime medical benefits for his knee and back condition, the claimant was entitled to those benefits notwithstanding a gap of more than 60 months in his treatment.

Newlon v. Teck American, Inc. [11/10/15] 2015 MT 317, 381 Mont. 378, 360 P.3d 1134 Although the 60-month rule was in effect at the time the parties agreed to settle the claimant’s claim for $25,000 and lifetime medical benefits for his knee and back condition, the court found no provision which prevented the employer from contracting around the statute or from promising more than is provided in the statute.  With no conflict with the relevant statutes, the court found that the promise of lifetime care is not an illegal objective.  Under a legal contract, a deal is a deal.

Dauenhauer v. Montana State Fund [07/03/12] 2012 MTWCC 22 Where a claimant requested authorization to see his physician well within 60 months of his previous treatment, but the claims adjuster denied authorization and later denied the claimant further medical benefits under the 60-month rule, the claimant’s request for authorization constituted “use” under § 39-71-704(1)(e), MCA, since the requested treatment was for legitimate, reasonably necessary medical care related to his industrial injury.

Schellinger v. St. Patrick Hospital and Health Sciences Center [03/23/12] 2012 MTWCC 10 The purpose of the statute of repose is to protect insurers by providing them timely notice that a claimant is making a claim for benefits.  Petitioner continually sought treatment for her psychological and cognitive difficulties despite Respondent’s denial of liability.  After this Court ruled that Petitioner’s condition was compensable, she sent Respondent two written demands for payment of her medical treatment.  Petitioner’s treatment and demands for payment were made within the 60-month period afforded pursuant to § 39-71-704(1)(e), MCA.  Therefore, her claim is not barred by the statute of repose.