Dvorak v. Montana State Fund [07/30/13] 2013 MT 210 The Montana Supreme Court held that the question of when Petitioner knew or should have known that she was suffering from an occupational disease was not amenable to summary disposition where Petitioner’s treating physician testified that he did not conclude that Petitioner had a specific pathological condition until December 2010 and did not conclude she had an occupational disease until March or April 2011, when he informed Petitioner of his conclusion, after which Petitioner timely filed her claim for benefits.   Although Petitioner conceded that she knew she suffered from a repetitive motion condition as far back as February 2006, the WCC failed to take the doctor’s testimony into account and incorrectly granted summary judgment where a material question of fact remained.

Spencer v. Montana Schools Group Ins. Authority [06/10/15] 2015 MTWCC 12 Summary judgment was proper where, even assuming that the two-year statute of limitations for filing a claim after benefits were denied was tolled during the pendency of the second mediation, the mediation process was concluded on the twenty-fifth day after mailing the mediator’s second report, which was well over a month before the Petition for Hearing was filed.

Newlon v. Teck American Inc. (Formerly Cominco) [05/08/14] 2014 MTWCC 12 Section 39-71-601(2), MCA, applies to the Department and does not refer to the powers of this Court.  Therefore, the Court rejected Respondent’s argument that it precludes this Court from applying equitable estoppel in circumstances not enunciated within the statute.

Dvorak v. Montana State Fund [05/05/14] 2014 MTWCC 11 Where neither Petitioner nor her treating physician put any thought into the cause of her symptoms, and Petitioner’s treating physician did not question whether a more aggressive approach to diagnosis and treatment was warranted, the Court held that Petitioner first knew or should have known that she suffered from an occupational disease on the day that her treating physician referred her to a specialist and took her off work.

Dvorak v. Montana State Fund [05/05/14] 2014 MTWCC 11 Since the Montana Supreme Court has held that the use of pain mediation “cuts both ways” in considering whether a claimant should have known she had an occupational disease, the Court found little, if any, probative value in the fact that Petitioner used Tylenol 3 to reduce her work-related pain for years prior to her formal diagnosis.

Monroe v. MACO Workers Comp Trust [03/17/14] 2014 MTWCC 7 Both Petitioner and her deceased husband believed the husband’s asbestos-related disease (ARD) arose from the many years he worked for W.R. Grace.  After Petitioner’s husband died, her attorney found an industrial hygienist who explained how her husband was exposed to asbestos while on the county road crew, and a physician established that the husband’s ARD was more probably than not significantly impacted by his work for the county.  The Court concluded that Petitioner could not have known that the county was the last employer to injuriously expose her husband to asbestos-causing disease until informed by her attorney, and her claim was not time-barred pursuant to § 39-71-601(1), MCA.

Romine v. Northerwestern Energy [10/17/12] 2012 MTWCC 35 The statute of limitations begins to run when a worker knows or should know that he suffers from an occupational disease, as set forth in § 39-71-601(3), MCA.  The Court rejected Petitioner’s argument that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the worker knows or should know that his employment is the leading cause contributing to the result.  The “major contributing cause” analysis goes to whether a condition is compensable as an occupational disease – not whether a worker knew or should have known that he suffers from an occupational disease. 

Romine v. Northerwestern Energy [10/17/12] 2012 MTWCC 35 Where Petitioner received both diagnoses and treatment for his shoulder and low-back complaints, the Court concluded that he should have known by that time that these conditions resulted from an occupational disease, thereby triggering the statute of limitations under § 39-71-601(3), MCA.  Conversely, since Petitioner did not receive a diagnosis or treatment for his cervical condition until nearly a year later, the statute of limitations for that condition did not start to run until diagnosis or treatment triggered it.

Morse v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. [05/03/12] 2012 MTWCC 16 Although Petitioner’s time-of-injury employer apparently created an incident report for Petitioner’s industrial accident, the parties could not find the report and no one testified that Petitioner had signed it.  Therefore, the Court concluded that the missing report did not fulfill the requirements of § 39-71-601, MCA.

Tinker v. Montana State Fund [07/07/08] 2008 MTWCC 33 The WCA no longer has a general definition of “disability” for reasons that are unclear from the legislative history. However, the legislature clearly made a concerted effort to revise all the statutes which reference some sort of “disability” so that they require a wage loss or inability to perform one’s time-of-injury job as an element of each definition. In the present case, where Petitioner had a commonplace slip and fall accident and missed no work, and assumed that the residual aches and pains would heal over time, and where he subsequently sought medical treatment only when his pain reached a level where he had difficulty performing his job duties, Petitioner lacked knowledge of his disability until he sought treatment because of his inability to perform his job duties.

[1999] Lanz v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp [04/12/05] 2005 MTWCC 18 Section 39-71-601, MCA (1999), which provides time limitations for the filing of workers’ compensation claims, applies only to claims for workers’ compensation benefits and not to disputes involving the employment preference provided in section 39-71-317(2), MCA (1999).

[1983] Lako v. ERD/UEF [10/25/02] 2002 MTWCC 53 The one-year claim filing requirement, § 39-71-601(1), MCA (1983-1993), applies to claims with the Uninsured Employers' Fund since "all appropriate provisions" of the Workers' Compensation Act apply to UEF claims. § 39-71-505, MCA (1977-2001). (Note: this decision was affirmed at Lako v. ERD/UEF, 2004 MT 290, 323 Mont. 334, 100 P.3d 142. Affirmed.)

[1985] McGuin v. State Fund [12/16/99] 1999 MTWCC 82 Claimant who did not realize until years later that incident occurring during 1986 diving training resulted in serious ear problems was not barred by his failure to file a claim within one year of the incident. Because he was unaware of his condition or that it arose during the work incident, he filed a timely claim within one year of the diagnosis of his condition.