27-1-221, MCA
MONTANA
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS |
| [1999]
Olszewski
v. BMC West Corporation, 2004
MT 187 Under section 39-71-413, MCA (1999), Sherner
v. Conoco, Inc., 2000 MT 50, and the definition of malice codified
at section 27-1-221(2), MCA, to meet the intentional act exception to
the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, an
employee must demonstrate that the employer or fellow employee had knowledge
of facts or intentionally disregarded facts that create a high probability
of injury to the plaintiff and: (a) deliberately proceeded to act in
a conscious or intentional disregard of the high probability of injury
to the plaintiff; or (b) deliberately proceeded to act with indifference
to the high probability of injury to the plaintiff. |
[1999]
Olszewski
v. BMC West Corporation, 2004
MT 187 Summary judgment properly granted to employer under exclusivity
provisions of Workers’ Compensation Act where there was no evidence
co-employee actually knew trusses would fall on injured worker, nor
that trusses would probably fall. Possibility that co-employee could
foresee that it was possible trusses would fall (and acted carelessly)
does not create the high probability of injury necessary to meet the
threshold for suit outside the workers’ compensation system. |
[1999]
Olszewski
v. BMC West Corporation, 2004
MT 187 Evidence that employer saved money by cutting corners does
not alone show malice sufficient to defeat the exclusivity provisions
of the Workers’ Compensation Act. |
[1999]
Olszewski
v. BMC West Corporation, 2004
MT 187 The standard for avoiding the exclusivity provisions of the
Workers’ Compensation Act requires that the employer actually
knew of, or intentionally disregarded, a probability of injury that
is higher than that caused by gross negligence. |
WORKERS'
COMPENSATION COURT DECISIONS |