Use Back Button to return to Index of Cases
IN THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1996 MTWCC 2 MARY C. STORMONT Petitioner vs. NATIONAL UNION FIRE OF PITTSBURGH Respondent/Insurer for HILLHAVEN CORPORATION Employer. Summary: Parties presented dispute regarding whether claimant must submit to independent medical examination by physician selected by insurer or whether Department of Labor and Industry must select the physician. Held: Under section 39-71-605, MCA (1995), a claimant must submit from time to time to examination by a physician or panel selected by the and shall also submit from time to time to examination by a department-selected physician. Limiting IMEs to physicians selected by the department would nullify one of the statutory provisions. Topics:
Pursuant to a request by counsel in this matter, the Court held a telephone conference with Mr. Steve M. Fletcher, attorney for petitioner, and Ms. Sarah R. Sexe, attorney for respondent. Counsel requested the Court to resolve a matter of statutory interpretation concerning independent medical examinations. Respondent has noticed an IME of petitioner. It designated Dr. Rappaport of Big Timber to perform the examination. The sole dispute between the parties is whether the respondent can designate the IME examiner or whether only the Department of Labor and Industry can do so. In arguing that only the Department can designate the examiner, Mr. Fletcher points to subsection (2) of section 39-71-605, MCA, which provides that in the event of a "dispute concerning the physical condition of the claimant or the cause or causes of the injury," the Department, at the request of either the insurer or claimant, shall designate the examiner. Subsection (1), however, provides that the insurer may require a claimant to submit to an IME by a physician it designates. The two subsections read as follows:
The two subsections must be read together, harmonized and reconciled if possible. As stated in Montana Auto. Ass'n v. Greely, 193 Mont. 378, 389, 632 P.2d 300, 306 (1981):
Petitioner argues that the present case involves a question of what caused claimant's current condition and, therefore, subsection (2) applies and is exclusive. While the Court agrees that subsection (2) applies, it is clear that the subsection is not exclusive. Subsection (1), which gives the insurer the right to compel a claimant to submit to an examination by a physician of its choice, does not on its face limit the circumstances or issues under which it may exercise that right. Indeed, limiting the insurer's right to examination to issues and matters outside the scope of subsection (2) could effectively nullify the provision altogether since it is difficult to imagine a circumstance or issue not encompassed within the authority of the Department under subsection (2). Moreover, the highlighted portion of the last sentence of subsection (1)(a), expressly contemplates an overlap between the two subsections. It provides that a claimant may be subject to examination under both subsections. The two sections are readily and easily harmonized and given effect by interpreting them as providing alternatives for IME examinations. THEREFORE, I FIND that pursuant to subsection (1) of section 39-71-605, MCA, the claimant is subject to examination by a physician designated by respondent. Since Mr. Fletcher indicated that petitioner will submit to such examination should I so hold, a further order is unnecessary. Dated in Helena, Montana, this 5th day of January, 1996. (SEAL) /s/ Mike
McCarter c: Mr. Steve
M. Fletcher |
Use Back Button to return to Index of Cases