IN THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2000
MTWCC 64
WCC
No. 9911-8365
LOUIS
NIELSON
Petitioner
vs.
STATE
COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND
Respondent/Insurer
for
TNT
WELL SERVICING, INCORPORATED
Employer.
FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT
REVERSED
AND REMANDED 4/23/03
Summary of Case:
During April 1995, claimant sought treatment for numbness, tingling,
and pain in both arms, but primarily in his left arm. He ceased working
in May 1995. Claimant's right arm condition was accepted by State
Fund as an injury under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), but his left
arm condition was accepted as an occupational disease. In Nielson
v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 1999 MTWCC 49, this claimant sought
permanent total disability benefits, which were denied. He now seeks permanent
partial disability benefits on the basis of the record presented
in the prior case. He alleges the debilitating pain in both arms prevents
his return to his time-of-injury job (servicing oil wells) or other positions
involving heavy physical demands.
Held:
Because permanent partial disability benefits are not available under
the Occupational Disease Act (§ 39-72-703, MCA), the relevant inquiry
is whether claimant is permanently partially disabled from his right
arm condition which State Fund did accept as an injury under WCA. His
claim is governed by the 1993 version of the WCA, which defines permanent
partial disability as a condition, after MMI, in which a worker (a) has
a medically determined physical restriction as the result of an injury
which (b) impairs his ability to work. Claimant did not prove he has a
medically determined physical restriction impairing work. Having found
claimant's subjective reports of pain not credible, the Court finds expert
opinions supporting claimant's case unpersuasive since they rely upon
claimant's subjective claims. The Court credits other medical providers
who found claimant's reports of disability exaggerated and without objective
basis and who did not place any physical restrictions on claimant.
Topics:
Benefits:
Permanent Partial Benefits: Generally. Where claimant sought
PPD benefits on the basis of disability in both arms, but only the right
arm condition was accepted as an injury by the insurer, the relevant
inquiry was whether claimant was permanently partially disabled due
to his right arm condition. Because PPD benefits are not available under
the Occupational Disease Act (§39-72-703, MCA), claimant's left arm
condition, accepted by the insurer as an occupational disease, could
not give rise to a claim for PPD benefits on the record presented.
Benefits:
Permanent Partial Benefits: Generally. Under the 1993 version
of the WCA, PPD claimant failed to prove that, after MMI, he had a medically
determined physical restriction as the result of an injury which impaired
his ability to work (§39-71-116(19), MCA). Having found claimant's subjective
reports of pain not credible, the Court was not persuaded by expert
opinions relying on those subjective reports, but credited other experts
finding claimant's reports of disability without objective basis and
refusing to place physical restrictions on claimant.
Disability: Permanent
Partial. Under the 1993 version of the WCA, PPD claimant
failed to prove that, after MMI, he had a medically determined physical
restriction as the result of an injury which impaired his ability
to work (§39-71-116(19), MCA). Having found claimant's subjective
reports of pain not credible, the Court was not persuaded by expert
opinions relying on those subjective reports, but credited other experts
finding claimant's reports of disability without objective basis and
refusing to place physical restrictions on claimant.
Impairment: Generally.
Under the 1993 version of the WCA, PPD claimant failed to prove that,
after MMI, he had a medically determined physical restriction as the
result of an injury which impaired his ability to work (§39-71-116(19),
MCA). Having found claimant's subjective reports of pain not credible,
the Court was not persuaded by expert opinions relying on those subjective
reports, but credited other experts finding claimant's reports of
disability without objective basis and refusing to place physical
restrictions on claimant.
Medical Conditions
(by specific condition): Carpel Tunnel Syndrome. Particular
tests used by one physician as providing evidence of carpel tunnel
syndrome questioned by other medical providers as not based on valid
methodology and not found persuasive by Court regarding alleged permanent
partial disability.
Medical Evidence:
Functional Capacity Evaluations. Court not persuaded by conclusions
of Functional Capacity Evaluation where record suggested symptom magnification
by claimant during testing and failure of claimant to participate
in work conditioning program associated with FCE.
Witnesses:
Credibility. Having found claimant's subjective reports of
pain not credible, Court found expert opinions relying on claimant's
subjective reports not persuasive.
¶1 This matter is before
the Court on a stipulated record based on proceedings in Louis Nielson
v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 1999 MTWCC 49, WCC No. 9902-8158.
In that case, petitioner Louis Nielson (claimant) sought permanent total
disability benefits. His request was denied. In the present case, claimant
seeks permanent partial disability benefits on the basis of
the same record presented in the prior case. The parties have not
presented new or additional evidence.
¶2 I incorporate the prior
decision, a copy of which is attached, and make the following additional
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Additional Findings of
Fact
¶3 As set forth in the conclusions
of law which follow, to prove permanent partial disability the claimant
must show he has "a medically determined physical restriction as a result
of an injury" and that the restriction impairs his ability to work.
Since there is no provision under the Occupational Disease Act (ODA)
for permanent partial disability benefits, and claimant's left arm complaints
were accepted as an occupational disease, any physical restriction and
impaired ability to work must arise, if at all, from claimant's right
arm condition.
¶4 In my prior decision I
analyzed the persuasiveness of the medical and vocational opinions,
along with claimant's credibility. I reaffirm that analysis.
¶5 As I found previously,
claimant was not a credible witness. I am persuaded he has exaggerated
his pain in his testimony and in his reports to the physicians and other
medical professionals who have examined or treated him.
¶6 In determining whether
claimant suffers a "medically determined physical restriction," I initially
note a lack of persuasive objective medical evidence verifying physical
restrictions of claimant's use of either of his arms
impairing his ability to work. Objective medical evidence relating to
the right arm is particularly lacking. The following is significant:
a. The initial
medical record of Dr. Lofti Ben-Youssef states:
The patient is a 45 year
old hot oil truck driver, who has been complaining of three weeks
history of sudden onset of numbness of the left hand, radiating
upward to the posterior medial aspect of the left elbow, present
during the day and at night, to the point where the patient now
cannot trust his left. The patient states that the only way he could
sleep at night is with his hand overhead and he has to sleep on
his back, which is something he hasn't been used to. The
patient is worried because the same problem is starting on the right
hand after he pulled on a hot oil hose.
(Ex. 9 at
9, emphasis added.) At this point claimant's primary complaint was with
his left hand. (Id.)
b. Dr. Williams,
who examined claimant and did nerve conduction studies in 1995, wrote
that "no abnormalities were found on neurophysiological testing." (Ex.
13 at 2.)
c. While
Dr. Ben-Youssef initially diagnosed bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome,
his focus in July 1995, was overuse syndrome of the left
wrist and forearm. (Ex. 19 at 3; Ex. 9 at 10.)
d. In 1995,
Dr. Settergren diagnosed "left lateral epicondylitis
and some signs and symptoms of cubital tunnel syndrome." (Ex. 16. at
2.)
e. During
1997, Dr. Bill Rosen could not find support for any particular diagnosis
other than right extensor pollicis tendonitis and possible chronic pain
syndrome. (Ex. 10 at 6-7.)
f. Electrodiagnostic
studies conducted of claimant by Dr. Donald H. See during 1997 were
normal. (Ex. 12 at 1-2.)
g. Electrodiagnostic
studies of claimant during 1998, by Dr. Patrick Cahill, a neurologist,
were also normal. (Ex. 14 at 8.) While Dr. Cahill suggested "possible
mild bilateral medial epicondylitis," ( id.
at 9, emphasis added) Dr. Ross testified he did not find support even
for a diagnosis of epicondylitis. (Transcript in WCC No. 9902-8158 at
139; hereinafter referred to as Tr.)
h. Dr. Robert
Schultz, who examined claimant in 1998, found no obvious weakness or
atrophy in the muscles of either arm. (Ex. 14 at 4-5.) While "not sure
of the etiology of this patient's overall complaints," Dr. Schultz stated
claimant "does not obviously have a motor nerve injury without demonstrable
weakness." (Id. at 5.) Dr. Schultz also commented upon obvious
"psychiatric over lay." (Id.)
i. Dr. Scott
Ross, who examined claimant in 1998, found no objective findings to
support claims of right or left upper extremity pain. (Ex. 14 at 16.)
j. While Dr. Gaddy's
1995 EMG, and nerve conduction testing found "electrical evidence" of
right and left carpal tunnel syndrome, her findings are not supported
by the other studies. More recent testing and the opinions of other
physicians cast serious doubt on the validity of her studies and diagnoses.
Moreover, Dr. Ross testified that the methodology used by Dr. Gaddy
is questioned in mainstream medical circles. (Tr. at 139.) I am not
persuaded by Dr. Gaddy's findings.
¶7 Claimant
has failed to persuade me that he suffers a physical restriction of his
right arm which impairs his ability to work.
a. The opinions
of Dr. Ben-Youssef and physical therapist Ron O'Neill (O'Neill), which
support claimant, were based upon claimant's subjective complaints,
which I do not credit. Both experts opined claimant could not even perform
jobs as sales clerk, video rental clerk, and auto salesman. My rejection
of their opinions was implicit within my finding that claimant is not
permanently totally disabled.
b. Dr. Schumann's
work restrictions for claimant were "subjectively based." Moreover,
Dr. Schumann noted that a period of work hardening would be necessary
before it could be determined whether some jobs were within claimant's
abilities. (Ex. 15 at 4.)
c. While Dr. Rosen only
approved positions which were less demanding than claimant's time-of-injury
job, he did not exclude other more demanding jobs or opine that any
particular physical restrictions were medically supported. Indeed,
his September 17, 1997 letter to Todd Jones suggests otherwise:
Based on my evaluation
of January 10, 1997 and review of Dr. See's reports the only diagnoses
I am comfortable in claiming in Mr. Neilsen's [sic] case is that
of right extensor pollicis tendonitis noted by positive Finkelstein's
maneuver. I note that Dr. See did note significant tenderness
over the medial epicondyles bilaterally however, to my recollection
the patient had diffuse tenderness throughout his entire forearms
which I cannot contribute to any specific syndrome, disease or
injury. Therefore, the only problem I can identify based on my
evaluation of Mr. Neilsen [sic] and my review of his electrodiagnostic
studies is right extensor pollicis tendonitis.
Without
actually examining Mr. Neilsen [sic], I cannot determine if he is
at maximum medical improvement for this latter problem. Otherwise,
with regard to his other complaints of pain, I do feel that he is
at maximum medical improvement. Furthermore, based on my
examination of January 10 he would have no impairable [sic] rating
given the normal nerve conduction studies and absence of other objective
findings which could contribute to a ratable impairment.
(Ex. 10 at
15, emphasis added.)
d. Dr. See is similarly
on record as approving specific jobs, but, like Dr. Rosen, he did
not exclude more physically demanding jobs, nor did he impose any
particular physical restrictions. Indeed, Dr. See made clear he did
not believe claimant "ever had any peripheral nerve entrapment and
certainly didn't on the occasion of these studies." (Ex. 12 at 6.)
e. The Schultz - Cahill
- Ross medical panel did not exclude any jobs, instead recommending
a two-week work conditioning program followed by an exit functional
capacity examination. (Ex. 14 at 2.) The panel consensus recognized
the "possibility that the functional capacity evaluation repeat would
be indicative of the ability of the patient to return to his previous
job." (Id.)
f. Dr. Ross
testified at trial that he placed no physical restrictions on claimant.
(Tr. at 158.)
¶8 The two functional capacity
evaluations (FCE) of claimant also do not persuade me he has a physical
restriction which impairs his ability to work. The first FCE was conducted
during February 1997. Drs. Ross, Schultz, and Cahill were not comfortable
relying on this report during their 1998 examination, noting the lapse
of time since the evaluation and their preference for an evaluation
which included testing both before and after a work conditioning program.
(Ex. 14 at 2.) Implicit within their rejection of the 1997 FCE, was
the concern that claimant had not accurately represented his abilities.
(Id.)
¶9 At trial, Dr. Ross was
explicit in his reasons for not relying on the second FCE, conducted
by physical therapist O'Neill. Dr. Ross explained:
First of all, Mr. Nielson
had participated minimally in the functional capacity evaluation and
the work conditioning program, or at least in the work conditioning
program. I believe he attended four out of ten days, and worked approximately
an hour, hour and a half on each day, which in my view was inadequate
in terms of trying to make an objective evaluation.
A second concern I had
was basically that Mr. O'Neill had reported as bjective what I felt
were subjective complaints, which I had found on my evaluation as
well, basically subjective complaints without objective correlation.
(Tr. at 141.) Dr. Ross opined
the FCE conducted by O'Neill was "essentially invalid" because "[t]here
wasn't enough participation in the work conditioning program." (Id.
at 143.)
¶10 Dr. Ross was even more
specific in his December 27, 1998 letter to the claims adjuster regarding
the O'Neill FCE. Dr. Ross wrote:
In the FCE
notes, Mr. O'Neill describes objective findings which are primarily
subjective complaints of pain, pins and needles and numbness reported
by the patient. There are few reliable objective findings noted during
the FCE. Of importance, Mr. O'Neill notes moderate symptom magnification
on page two of the FCE dated 11/02/98. In addition, Mr. O'Neill
questions the benefit of work hardening due to the patient's constant
complaints of irritability and aggravation with any type of activity.
It should be noted, however, that the FCE was recommended because the
only previous FCE was over one year old and the panel evaluation (Drs.
Cahill, Schultz and Ross) did not demonstrate any objective findings
whatsoever. Indeed, during the panel evaluation, the patient exhibited
subjective complaints of pain without any objective correlation.
In the FCE
done on exit from the work conditioning program (11/16/98) Mr. O'Neill
lists objective findings which are, in reality, subjective complaints.
He again notes moderate to maximal symptom magnification by the patient.
Of interest, the patient was able to tolerate only one-half hour per
day of work conditioning activities and missed four of 10 scheduled
visits due to pain complaints. He also reported poor sleep and increased
pain medication during this period of time despite his minimal participation
in the program. Mr. O'Neill notes that the patient did demonstrate some
improvement regarding walking, squatting and lifting, but no significant
changes insofar as functional abilities. He opined that Mr. Nielson
was not a likely candidate for further work conditioning and stated
that holding a job of any sort is questionable according to findings
from the FCE and attempts at work conditioning.
(Ex. 14 at 20-21, emphasis
added.) In the letter, as at trial, Dr. Ross found "the FCE results
are essentially invalid." (Id. at 21.)
¶11 At trial, Dr. Ross also
noted inconsistencies between measures obtained by O'Neill and measures
he obtained in his own examination of claimant. In particular, he noted
that claimant's grip strength decreased from the time of his examination
of claimant to the first measure by O'Neill, then decreased further
by the time of O'Neill's second measure. (Tr. at 143-144.) Dr. Ross
did not believe there was a medical explanation for this decrease, testifying
he had never seen such decreases. (Id. at 145.)
¶12 Having reviewed the FCE
report, listened to Dr. Ross's explanation at trial, and observed claimant's
own testimony, I am persuaded by Dr. Ross's evaluation of the O'Neill
FCE. I am also persuaded that the earlier FCE is of little value in
assessing claimant's abilities for the reasons noted by Dr. Ross, including
concern that the earlier FCE was also infused with claimant's symptom
magnification. Thus, I find no objective medical basis for concluding
claimant suffers any particular physical restriction resulting from
injury to his right arm.
¶13 The only impairment rating
given claimant was by Dr. Ben-Youssef:
5-11-98.
The patient comes back still complaining of bilateral hand pain with
use, and in the past, the patient's neuro evaluation, by Dr. Gaddy,
on 08/03/95 showed that the patient had bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome
and bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome with electrical changes that are
significant. The patient has not improved much in the past three years.
I think that he has reached maximum healing and using the AMA Guides
for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, due to entrapment neuropathy,
page 57, table 16, with severe carpal tunnel syndrome giving the patient
40% impairment of the upper extremity, severe ulnar nerve entrapment,
giving the patient 50% impairment of the upper extremity, which equals
90% impairment of the upper extremity, which equals 50% of whole
person impairment and that is using table 3, page 20. The evaluation
is for each upper extremity.
(Ex. 9 at 15, emphasis added.)
At deposition, Dr. Ben-Youssef testified his impairment rating was based
upon claimant's reports of pain and "a diagnosis made in the past by
the neurologist." (Ben-Youssef Dep. at 25.) Because I do not credit
claimant's pain reports or Dr. Gaddy's findings, I am unpersuaded by
Dr. Ben-Youssef's impairment rating.
¶14 I also find no reliable
vocational evidence indicating claimant has suffered a wage loss.
¶15 The record contains the
report and trial testimony of Dennis McLuskie (McLuskie), a senior vocational
consultant for Crawford & Company. In his initial employability
assessment, McLuskie concluded claimant "was medically precluded at
that time from returning to his time of injury position based on the
opinion from Dr. Ben-Youssef, the treating physician." (Tr. at 99-100.)
Subsequently, McLuskie learned that Dr. Ross, after the panel evaluation,
believed claimant may be able to return to his time of injury job. (Id.
at 116.) At trial, McLuskie testified that returning to the time-of-injury
job was a reasonable vocational option for claimant.
(Id. at 117.) Thus, evidence from McLuskie does not
support claimant's contention he suffers a wage loss.
¶16 Bob Zadow (Zadow), a
certified rehabilitation counselor, testified by deposition. He reviewed
medical reports and rehabilitation materials regarding claimant. (Zadow
Dep. at 7.) During April 1999, Zadow spoke for an hour by telephone
with claimant about his vocational history, his perceptions for rehabilitation,
and "what he perceived his most recent medical status to be." (Id.
at 10-11.) Claimant talked about his restrictive range of motion and
the discomfort he experienced once he engaged in any kind of significant
physical activity. (Id.) He told Zadow he "felt [that he] could
not return to work at this point." (Id.) There is no indication
Zadow questioned the accuracy of claimant's report of his abilities.
¶17 Zadow relied upon the
opinions of Dr. Ben-Youssef and the functional capacity evaluation performed
by O'Neill. (Id.) While he reviewed the opinions of medical
providers other than Dr. Ben-Youssef, he gave "a fair amount of weight"
to Dr. Ben-Youssef's opinions because he was the treating physician
and had the most contact with claimant. (Id. at 17.) Zadow
also relied upon claimant's own reports of pain. (Id. at 19-20.)
Based on this understanding of claimant's medical condition, Zadow opined
claimant could not return to his time-of-injury work. (Id.
at 13.) He further concluded: "If I take a look at Dr. Ben-Youssef's
report, Mr. O'Neill's report, and Mr. Nielson's reports of his restrictions
and pain, it would be my opinion that the Montana labor market would
be extremely limited as far as what he could return to." (Id.
at 19-20.) Zadow testified he was aware of no work that claimant could
perform given those limitations. (Id. at 20.)
¶18 Since Zadow's opinions
are based on claimant's subjective reports of pain and medical evidence
I find unpersuasive, I find his opinions unpersuasive.
CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
¶19 Claimant's request for
permanent partial disability benefits is governed by the 1993 versions
of the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act. Buckman
v. Montana Deaconess Hospital, 224 Mont. 318, 321, 730 P.2d 380,
382 (1986).
¶20 Permanent partial disability
benefits are not available under the Occupational Disease
Act. Section 39-72-703, MCA (1993), provides:
No compensation
for partial disability. No compensation as provided in 39-72-701
is payable to an employee who is partially disabled from an occupational
disease.
Thus, claimant's request
for a permanent partial disability award must be based on his right
arm condition.
¶21 Permanent partial disability
benefits are governed by section 39-71-703, MCA (1993), which provides
in relevant part:
Compensation for
permanent partial disability. (1) If an injured worker suffers
a permanent partial disability and is no longer entitled to temporary
total or permanent total disability benefits, the worker is entitled
to a permanent partial disability award.
(2) The permanent
partial disability award must be arrived at by multiplying the percentage
arrived at through the calculation provided in subsection (3) by 350
weeks.
As set forth in the section,
to qualify for the benefits the claimant must be permanently partially
disabled, as defined in the Act.¶22
"Permanent partial disability" is defined by section 39-71-116(18),
MCA (1993), of the WCA as follows:
"Permanent partial disability"
means a condition, after a worker has reached maximum medical healing,
in which a worker:
(a) has a
medically determined physical restriction as a result of an injury as
defined in 39-71-119(1); and
(b) is able
to return to work in some capacity but the physical restriction impairs
the worker's ability to work. [Emphasis added.]
¶23 In Williams v. Plum
Creek Timber Co., 270 Mont. 209, 214, 891 P.2d 502, 505 (1995),
the Supreme Court considered the 1991 definition of "permanent partial
disability," which is identical to the 1993 definition, applicable in
this case. It said:
Section 116(15)
requires a claimant to meet a two prong test in order to be eligible
for permanent partial disability benefits under Section 703. To meet
the two prongs, the claimant (1) must have a medically determined physical
restriction as a result of an injury; and (2) must be able to return
to work in some capacity but the physical restriction must impair
the worker's ability to work. Therefore, according to the 1991
Act, if the physical restriction does not impair the claimant's ability
to work, then he or she is not permanently partially disabled under
Section 116(15), and is not entitled to a permanent partial disability
benefit award under Section 703.
¶24 Claimant bears the burden
of persuading me, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is permanently
partially disabled. See Ricks v. Teslow Consolidated, 162 Mont.
469, 483-84, 512 P.2d 1304 (1973); Dumont v. Aetna Fire Underwriters,
183 Mont. 190, 201, 598 P.2d 1099 (1979). He has not carried his burden
of persuasion. I am not persuaded that he has a medically determined
physical restriction as a result of an injury to his right arm. I am
also unpersuaded that his right arm condition impairs his ability to
work or is causing a wage loss.
¶25 Since claimant has not
prevailed, he is not entitled to costs.
JUDGMENT
¶26 1. Claimant is not entitled
to permanent partial disability benefits. His petition is dismissed.
¶27 2. Claimant is not entitled
to attorney fees, a penalty, or costs.
¶28 3. This JUDGMENT is certified
as final for purposes of appeal pursuant to ARM 24.5.348.
¶29 4. Any party to this
dispute may have 20 days in which to request a rehearing from these
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
DATED in Helena, Montana,
this 20th day of September, 2000.
(SEAL)
/s/ Mike
McCarter
JUDGE
c: Mr. Marvin L. Howe
Mr. David A. Hawkins
Date Submitted: May 10, 2000
Attached: Nielson 1999
MTWCC 49
1. Section
39-71-119, MCA (1993) in turn provides in relevant part:
Injury
and accident defined. (1) "Injury" or "injured" means:
(a) internal
or external physical harm to the body;
(b) damage
to prosthetic devices or appliances, except for damage to eyeglasses,
contact lenses, dentures, or hearing aids; or
(c) death.
(2) An injury
is caused by an accident. An accident is:
(a) an
unexpected traumatic incident or unusual strain;
(b) identifiable
by time and place of occurrence;
(c) identifiable
by member or part of the body affected; and
(d) caused
by a specific event on a single day or during a single work shift.
(3) "Injury"
or "injured" does not mean a physical or mental condition arising from:
(a) emotional
or mental stress; or
(b) a
nonphysical stimulus or activity.
(4) "Injury" or "injured" does
not include a disease that is not caused by an accident.
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