Statutes and Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History

In the Matter of Clarke v. Scott Massey, d/b/a All Seasons Constr., 271 Mont. 412 (1995) (No. 95-106) If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation is required, and the courts will resort to legislative history only if legislative intent cannot be determined from the plain wording of the statute.

Greer v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. [02/03/16] 2016 MTWCC 2 The Court held that the legislative history did not support the insurer’s argument that the Legislature intended to abolish the travel allowance exception to the going and coming rule for remote jobsites.  Rather, the statutory amendments provided a mechanism by which employers could exclude employees from the course and scope of employment while traveling so long as the employer pays the travel allowance pursuant to a written document which designates the payment as an incentive to work at a particular jobsite.

Peters v. American Zurich Ins. Co. [07/31/13] 2013 MTWCC 16 Where Petitioner raises a legislative intent argument but provides no support for the argument by way of legislative history, the Court will not find the argument persuasive.

Wombold v. Montana State Fund [12/29/09] 2009 MTWCC 40 Where it is indisputable from the minutes of a committee meeting that the legislators, proponents, opponents, and other interested parties who testified all interpreted the language of the existing statute in the same manner, the legislative intent is clear regarding the meaning of the statute.

Estate of James Jacques v. Borden, Inc. [3/20/97] 1997 MTWCC 14 Where modifying language used in Senate Committee discussions was not incorporated into final statute, that legislative history cannot lead the Court to insert a modification into the statute not present in the plain, unambiguous language as adopted.