Occupational Disease: Proximate Cause
MONTANA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS |
Polk
v. Planet Insurance Co., 287 Mont. 79, 951 P.2d 1015 (1997) In
light of the occupational disease proximate cause requirement, set out
at section 39-71-408, MCA, and the aggravation statute, section 39-71-706,
MCA, occupational aggravations of preexisting non-occupational diseases
are compensable, as are occupational diseases which are aggravated by
non-occupational factors. The test for compensability under the OD Act
is whether occupational factors significantly aggravated a preexisting
condition, not whether occupational factors played the major or most significant
role in causing a particular disease. As long as an occupational exposure
substantially aggravated a pulmonary condition, claimant is entitled to
pro rata compensation for his disease. The DOL hearing examiner, and the
WC Court, erred in basing their decision on medical opinions by physicians
who operated under the mistaken assumption that occupational irritants
had to be the major factor causing a pulmonary condition for claimant
to receive compensation. |
Burglund v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 286 Mont. 134, 950
P.2d 1371 (1997) Supreme Court affirmed WCC determination that cause
of claimant's current back-related disability was 1984 injury and not
occupational disease insurer claimed arose after claimant returned to
work. Claimant met his burden of establishing a clear connection between
his current condition and the 1984 injury through physician's testimony.
Insurer did not prove causation through occupational disease where doctor
could not determine with any precision what effect claimant's resumed
work had on his condition, testified claimant's low back condition would
have deteriorated even if he had not resumed his UPS duties, and testified
that post-injury work was not a substantial cause of the degeneration. |
MONTANA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT DECISIONS |
Clapham v. Twin City [10/16/12] 2012 MTWCC 34 Where Petitioner’s treating physician opined that his work was the fourth in importance of five factors which contributed to his degenerative disk disease, the Court concluded that Petitioner’s work was not the “leading cause” as set forth in § 39-71-407(13), MCA. |
Johnson v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. [07/01/09] 2009 MTWCC 20 Where the Court found that Petitioner’s employment exposure to asbestos clearly exceeded his non-employment exposure, and the Court found the treating physician’s opinion that Petitioner’s exposure to asbestos during his years at Stimson was sufficient to cause his asbestos-related disease, the Court concluded that Petitioner suffers from an occupational disease as a result of his employment under the proximate causation test as set forth in Kratovil and pursuant to § 39-72-408, MCA. |
Fuss
v. Ins. Co. of NA and Valor [4/8/04] 2004 MTWCC 34 Where
the claimant has been determined to suffer from an occupational disease,
the insurer at risk at the time of the determination continues to be liable
for the condition unless it wholly resolves and the recurrence of the
condition is the result of factors unrelated to his employment. |
State
Fund v. Carl Murray [4/6/04] 2004 MTWCC 33 The fact that
the claimant's recreational activities may have contributed to his preexisting
bilateral knee condition does not preclude a finding of an occupational
disease where the evidence establishes that the claimant's work significantly
and materially aggravated his underlying condition. Affirmed Montana
State Fund v. Murray, 2005 MT
97 |
State
Fund v. Carl Murray [4/6/04] 2004 MTWCC 33 The Montana Occupational
Disease Act does not require that occupational exposures be the principal
or substantial cause of the condition, only that the "occupational factors
significantly aggravated a preexisting condition." § 39-72-408, MCA (1971-1999); Polk v. Planet Ins. Co., 287
Mont. 79, 951 P.2d 1015 (1997). Affirmed Montana
State Fund v. Murray, 2005 MT
97 |
State
Fund v. Carl Murray [4/6/04] 2004 MTWCC 33 Aggravations of
preexisting conditions are compensable under the Montana Occupational
Disease Act. § 39-72-706, MCA (1989-2003). Affirmed Montana
State Fund v. Murray, 2005 MT
97 |
Christensen
v. Rosauer's Supermarket, Inc. [10/28/03] 2003 MTWCC 62 Where
the Court found claimant incredible, and the medical opinion supporting
her claim for benefits was based on her incredible history of events,
she has not proven that her work as a cook caused her herniated disk and
resulting disability and medical treatment. |
B.
v. Northwest Healthcare [7/28/03] 2003 MTWCC 52 Foot condition
involving swelling and pain suffered by nursing home housekeeper was not
caused by employment where her condition was inconsistent with any trauma,
even repetitive trauma, occurring at work and where she suffered a long
history of fibromyalgia and other medical conditions, including prior
swelling in her legs. |
Watkins
v. State Fund [2/22/02] 2002 MTWCC 11 Where claimant presented
no medical testimony that he suffered from an occupational disease proximately
causing his condition, his occupational disease claim must fail. |
Liberty
Mutual v. Griner [11/09/01] 2001 MTWCC 58 In cases where claimant
suffered a prior work-related injury or occupational disease involving
the condition, a subsequent insurer is liable for an aggravation of the
prior condition if and only if the subsequent work exposure was different
from or in excess of ordinary, everyday activities typically occurring
outside the job. § 39-72-408(4), MCA (1997). |
Liberty
Mutual v. Griner [11/09/01] 2001 MTWCC 58 Where medical testimony
establishes that heavy labor caused harm the proximate cause requirement
of the Occupational Disease Act is satisfied. § 39-72-408 (1997). |
LaFournaise
v. State Fund [8/14/01] 2001 MTWCC 42 In evaluating medical opinions
concerning causation under the Occupational Disease Act, § 39-72-408,
MCA (1997), the Department of Labor must consider the substance of the
opinions rather than the use of precise, statutory language, and determine
whether the substance of the opinions satisfy the statutory criteria even
though not couched in the precise terms of the statute. |
Romero
v. Liberty Mutual & State Fund [1/29/01] 2001 MTWCC 5 Where
condition develops over a period of years as a natural progression and
result of an earlier workers' compensation injury, even though part of
the progression occurred during subsequent employment it does not constitute
an occupational disease and is the responsibility of the insurer for the
earlier injury since the progression was not fairly traceable to the subsequent
employment and is not a natural incident of the work or business. § 39-72-408,
MCA. [Note: The Supreme Court affirmed the WCC decision
in Romero v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins.
Co., 2001 MT 303N (a non-citeable decision.)] |
Polk
v. Planet Ins. Co. [2/26/97] 1997 MTWCC 6 WCC affirmed DOL hearing
officer's decision that medical panel correctly determined claimant was
not entitled to compensation for occupational exposure. [Note:
the WCC decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in Polk
v. Planet Insurance Co., 287 Mont. 79, 951 P.2d 1015 (1997),
on the ground that physicians rendering an opinion on occupational disease
causation misunderstood the appropriate standard.] |
Burglund
v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. [8/29/96] 1996 MTWCC 60
UPS driver and insurer disputed
whether claimant's current disability was result of 1984 back injury and
following surgery or occupational disease resulting from claimant's return
to work. Based on medical testimony, Court found condition was result
of earlier injury. Physician's testimony left no doubt that claimant's
1991 surgery, and thus his 1984 injury, are substantial and material factors
in claimant's current disability. WCC was persuaded claimant's continued
employment may have hastened the degenerative process, but was not persuaded
it substantially or materially did so. Most importantly, physician testified
that even had claimant not returned to a labor intensive job, his degenerative
condition would have ultimately progressed and that the current condition
is consistent with a natural progression of the underlying condition.
(Note: WCC decision affirmed by Supreme Court
in Steven K. Burglund v. Liberty Mutual
Fire Ins. Co., 286 Mont. 134, 950
P.2d 1371 (1997).) |
Erickson
v. Champion International [3/12/96] 1996 MTWCC 23 WCC reversed
and remanded DOL decision that claimant did not suffer from an occupational
disease where the decision rested on the opinion of a doctor who applied
an incorrect understanding of the law. The doctor opined that claimant's
knee condition was not an occupational disease because not all mill workers
develop similar knee conditions, ignoring the settled principle that an
employer takes a worker as it finds him, making the fact that non-susceptible
or non-predisposed workers would not be affected by working conditions
irrelevant to a determination whether an occupational disease exists in
a particular worker. |
Erickson
v. Champion International [3/12/96] 1996 MTWCC 23 The
fact that claimant's underlying condition would ultimately have been totally
disabling due to a natural progression of an underlying condition does
not preclude compensation where the disability was hastened by a work-related
injury or conditions. |
Shorten
v. State Comp. Ins. Fund [12/22/95] 1995 MTWCC 110 From the
fact that claimant may have suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome it does
not follow that her syndrome was the consequence, in whole or in part,
of occupational factors. She had a prior history of hand problems, her
job involved less repetitive hand motion than she claimed, and the medical
evidence did not establish a causal connection. |