Constitutional Law: Due Process: Substantive Due Process
MONTANA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS |
Goble and Gerber v. Montana State Fund, 2014 MT 99 Appellants failed to meet their burden of proof in challenging the constitutionality of § 39-71-744, MCA. Despite the assertion that the statute is purely punitive, the Montana Supreme Court found that sound policy decisions underlay the Legislature’s decision not to allow individuals who are not earning wages due to incarceration to continue to receive wage-loss benefits. |
Satterlee v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. [11/03/09] 2009 MT 368 Whether the quid pro quo principal of a bargained-for exchange is satisfied because claimants over the age of 65 receive benefits of “more or less equal value” to their forgone rights in tort is subject to honest debate. However, such a debate involves issues and decisions about public policy better suited to the Legislature. |
Satterlee v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. [11/03/09] 2009 MT 368 Where the claimant argued that § 39-71-710, MCA, terminates PTD benefits based on age and that the holding in Reesor prohibits such discrimination, the Montana Supreme Court found that the reasoning in Reesor was inapplicable to the case at bar. PPD and PTD benefits and their corresponding purposes are too different to equate them with one another. |
Satterlee v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. [11/03/09] 2009 MT 368 Although claimants who have worked less, and therefore do not qualify for SSRI, continue to collect PTD benefits while claimants who have worked more, and are therefore eligible for SSRI, have their PTD benefits terminated, the Montana Supreme Court concluded this does not rise to the level of an absurdity so that § 39-71-710, MCA, would be unconstitutional. The identification of at least one possible legitimate purpose is enough to affirm the Workers’ Compensation Court without resulting in an absurdity. |
MONTANA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT DECISIONS |
Hegg v. Montana State Fund [10/10/16] 2016 MTWCC 14 The remedy in a case in which workers’ compensation benefits are insufficient to uphold the quid pro quo is to strike the employer’s exclusive remedy defense and allow the employee to proceed with a tort claim – a decision that is solely within the province of the district court in a civil action against the employer. Where this Court cannot grant the claimant the remedy she seeks – i.e., to increase the amount of her benefits to an amount that would be sufficient – it will not rule on the claimant’s substantive due process challenge against § 39-71-721(2), MCA. |
Gerber v. Montana State Fund [03/28/13] 2013 MTWCC 9 Section 39-71-744(1), MCA, does not violate Petitioner’s right to substantive due process for failing to satisfy the quid pro quo principle behind the WCA - the surrendering of the injured workers’ right to sue his employer in tort in exchange for disability benefits - since the Petitioner here received sufficiently significant benefits, in the form of temporary total disability prior to his incarceration and remains eligible for medical benefits, so as to satisfy the quid pro quo doctrine. |
Gerber v. Montana State Fund [03/28/13] 2013 MTWCC 9 Section 39-71-744(1), MCA, does not violate Petitioner’s right to substantive due process, for the statute bears a rational relationship to the express legislative purpose of providing wage-loss benefits in a reasonable relationship to actual wages lost, and of returning a worker to work as quickly as possible after the worker has suffered an on-the-job injury or disease. An incarcerated worker has voluntarily removed himself from the competitive labor market by committing a crime; he is not losing wages due to his injury, and he cannot return to work until released from jail or prison. |
Goble v. Montana State Fund [03/28/13] 2013 MTWCC 8 Section 39-71-744(1), MCA, does not violate Petitioner’s right to substantive due process, for the statute bears a rational relationship to the express legislative purpose of providing wage-loss benefits in a reasonable relationship to actual wages lost, and of returning a worker to work as quickly as possible after the worker has suffered an on-the-job injury or disease. An incarcerated worker has voluntarily removed himself from the competitive labor market by committing a crime; he is not losing wages due to his injury, and he cannot return to work until released from jail or prison. |
Satterlee v. Lumberman's Mutual Ins. Co. [06/04/08] 2008 MTWCC 29 Where § 39-71-710, MCA, places a reasonable limitation on PTD benefits in order to contain the cost of the system for employers while ensuring that PTD claimants are compensated commensurately with the wages they were earning when they left the workforce for what otherwise would have been their remaining “work life”, the Court finds that the statute passes constitutional muster under a substantive due process challenge. Additionally, for the same reasons § 39-71-710, MCA, does not violate Petitioner’s right to equal protection, the statute does not unconstitutionally discriminate against Petitioners based on their age. |
Negethon
v. Montana State Fund [12/14/06] 2006 MTWCC 40
Petitioner's constitutional challenge of § 39-71-123, MCA, on the
grounds that the statute violates his right to substantive due process
when he lost his full-time unemployment benefits in exchange for reduced
workers' compensation benefits, failed because Petitioner did not convince
the Court beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute was unconstitutional. |
Fisch,
Frost, and Rausch v. State Fund [4/20/01] 2001 MTWCC 15 Failure
to provide impairment awards to permanently totally disabled workers
does not violate substantive due process rights. |
Fisch,
Frost, and Rausch v. State Fund [4/20/01] 2001 MTWCC 15 Distinctions
between benefits payable to permanently totally disabled workers and
permanently partially disabled workers are rationally related to legitimate
differences in the nature of their disabilities. |
Powell
v. State Compensation Insurance Fund [2/4/99] 1999 MTWCC 10
Section 39-71-1107(3), MCA (1995) does not violate federal or state
guarantees of equal protection and substantive due process. To succeed
in a constitutional challenge, claimant must persuade the Court beyond
a reasonable doubt that the statute is not constitutional. Equal protection
provisions do not prohibit different treatment of different groups or
classes of people so long as all persons within a group or class are
treated the same. The essence of substantive due process is similar
as applied to this case; the statute must be reasonably related to a
permissible legislative objective. A court considering a constitutional
challenge is not limited to reasons for the legislation as set out on
the face of the statutes or in legislative history, but may consider
any possible purpose of the legislation. Here, while the goal of cost
containment alone may not save legislation which treats similarly situated
people differently, there are cogent and logical reasons for limiting
payments to family members providing 24-hour domiciliary care. Family
members providing such care typically reside with the injured worker,
meaning they generally continue their ordinary life activities during
some of the day, and typically do not provide the trained, focused,
professional care given by non-family members who are working away from
their own home. These differences justify the statute. |
Bowers
v. State Fund [9/2/98] 1998 MTWCC 64 The presumption of correctness
afforded medical panel reports under section 39-72-610(1), MCA (1993)
of the ODA is unconstitutional as a violation of due process of law
and an unlawful delegation of executive power. |
Wieglenda
v. State Compensation Insurance Fund/Department of Labor and Industry,
No. 97-045 (1997) (Unpublished opinion) In an unpublished,
nonciteable opinion, Supreme Court affirmed WCC determination that section
39-71-704(1)(f), MCA (1993) did not deny equal protection or due process
by providing that insurer was not required to furnish maintenance care,
in this case chiropractic care, to injured worker. |
Wieglenda
v. State Compensation Insurance Fund [10/23/96] WCC No. 9606-7562
Section 39-71-704(1), MCA (1993), and other statutory and regulatory
provisions, do not deny equal protection or due process by providing
that an insurer is not required to furnish maintenance care. (Note:
WCC was affirmed by the Supreme Court in an unpublished, nonciteable
opinion, Wieglenda v. State Compensation Insurance
Fund/Department of Labor and Industry,
No. 97-045 (1997).) |
Simpson
v. Lewis and Clark County [02/16/95] 1995 MTWCC 14 Section
39-71-118(f), MCA (1991), which limits workers' compensation benefits
available to an individual performing community service work under court
order, does not violate constitutional provisions requiring equal protection,
full legal redress, or substantive due process, nor does it inflict
cruel and unusual punishment. The legislature's decision to provide
a more limited benefits package to workers injured while performing
court-ordered community service was rationally calculated to encourage
public agencies and non-profit organizations to participate in community
service programs while still affording some protection to the workers
(medical benefits and impairment award). |